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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-A RE-EVALUATION OF
THE PROSECUTOR'S UNBRIDLED DISCRETION
AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
Within the substantive and procedural areas of criminal law exists an
implied power, known even to the most uneducated layman, which by
its inherent potential has an unusual capacity for misuse or abuse. This
implied power has been tagged with the innocuous label of prosecutorial
discretion. Although discretionary power exists and permeates many
areas of the executive and judiciary, none is potentially more dangerous
than that of the public prosecutor. It is the purpose of this comment to
examine a situation which is ripe for re-evaluation and reform. The
area of prosecutorial discretion stands in sharp contrast to the traditional
constitutional principles of checks and balances and to the growing aware-
ness of civil rights and liberty. The inherent potential for abuse by an
office which is not subject to review, except in most unusual circum-
stances, ominously threatens the adversary system of criminal justice.
Consider, for example, the early morning raid on several sleeping citi-
zens by a special prosecutor's task force which resulted in the death of
two persons.' Over two years and seven investigations later the Cook
County State's Attorney and thirteen others were indicted and charged
with "obstructing justice."' 2 An in depth discussion of this particular topic
is outside of the scope of this paper, but it does serve to exemplify a situa-
tion which exists and a power which, if unchecked, can be abused.3  The
1. On December 4, 1969 Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were killed by gun-
fire in an early morning raid on Chicago's West Side by such a special prosecutor's
task force. See Chicago Daily News, Chicago Tribune, and Chicago Sun Times
for December 4 and following editions.
2. On August 24, 1971 a sealed indictment by a special grand jury, with
attorney Barnabas Sears acting as a special prosecutor, was opened at the direction
of the Illinois Supreme Court. The indictment was delayed due to unusual cir-
cumstances, unusual legal problems and unusual implications of the case. A special
session of the Supreme Court of Illinois was needed to order the opening of the
sealed envelope containing the indictment. See Chicago Daily News, Aug. 24,
1971, at 1.
3. Note, however, that these indicted persons have not at this time been
tried. In fact, several of the defendants have refused to plead contending that
the indictment is invalid. See Chicago Tribune, Sept. 1, 1971, at 1.
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significance of this incident is indicated by the extensive coverage of this
indictment by the mass media which generally ignores most legal pro-
ceedings.
The expanse of any inquiry and the many varied perspectives avail-
able to this type of analytical subject could out of necessity fill volumes
before reaching a workable and digestable discussion. Therefore, a basic
understanding of the underlying principles of criminal law, the processes
it follows, i.e., the procedures used to effectuate these underlying princi-
ples, and the complex interrelationship of both of these as they exist in
practice today,4 is required. This comment proceeds on the premise
the reader possesses this basic understanding of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law, and therefore, focuses primarily on the abuse of prose-
cutorial discretion and the remedies therefor.
DISCRETION DEFINED
Discretion can be reasonably defined as the power of free decision.5
A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power
permit him to make a choice among possible alternative courses of ac-
tion or inaction." A prosecutor derives his authority or power to exercise
his discretion by law.7 It is "an authority to act in certain conditions or
situations in accordance with an official's or an offical agency's own con-
sidered judgment or conscience."
Theoretically, absolute discretion, or implied absolute discretion (where
no express limitations are apparent) has the potential to be exercised
freely, without conditions precedent or subsequent. In reality, however,
the scope or extent of all power is restricted or limited to some extent,
directly or indirectly, legally or morally, etc. The limitations of a prose-
cutor's discretion are somewhat nebulous, and in general, undefined. 9
4. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (1969).
5. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1965).
6. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969). Davis' book offers an indication
of the growing awareness of the problems that uncontrolled discretion creates.
The book is a current source on the subject of official discretion, its scope, and
implication. Note also, that as late as 1965 it had been observed: "Despite the
enormous importance of the decision whether or not to prosecute, there has been
an amazingly small amount of material published in this area. . . . [N]o serious
study of the prosecutorial discretion has appeared in print in the past three
decades." Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV.
174, 175 (1965).
7. See generally LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18
AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970).
8. Id. at 532 n.1.
9. Compare text accompanying infra note 70.
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He has the authority by law to enforce certain laws1° by prosecuting of-
fenders. Whom he chooses to prosecute, what he charges them with,
whether he charges them at all, whether he later drops the charges or
recommends a lower sentence at the time of trial are all within the prose-
cutor's exercise of discretion. This type of unlimited discretion implies
by its very nature that a difference of opinion could arise as to how to
make the choice.
Before discussing the source of this power it is necessary to note, with
heavy emphasis, certain independent factors which have a profound im-
pact on the prosecutor's decision-making process. The overcrowding of
the criminal courts by the increasing number of cases,'1 while physical
facilities and judicial staff remain more or less constant, 1 2 has forced
plea bargaining' 3 and a form of mass justice upon our criminal system
as a necessity for survival. 14 This problem will be discussed later with
respect to a major argument in support of prosecutorial discretion and
again with respect to its potential for abuse. Suffice it for now to say
that the present circumstances influence certain, if not all, practices and
decisions made by a prosecutor. The influence of overcrowding is diffi-
cult to measure, but, as will be noted later, its effect is great.
Another factor which greatly influences the prosecutor's decision is poli-
tics. 15  A by-product of our electoral system is the requirement that
elected officials must remain popular enough to be re-elected.' 6 A prose-
cutor often has to curry the favor of other executive, legislative, or judi-
10. Note the loose and vague language as regarding the duty of and limits on
the prosecutor. In addition, note the numerous and varied laws at the disposal of
the prosecutor.
11. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT,
25-41 (1967) [hereinafter called PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
12. "The criminal caseload has more than doubled within the past decade,
while the size of the criminal bench has remained constant." N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1968, at 41, col. 2.
13. "Only the guilty plea system has enabled the courts to process their caseloads
with seriously inadequate resources." Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 51 (1968).
14. "Plea bargaining is not only legal but vitally necessary to prevent the col-
lapse of criminal justice in overloaded metropolitan court systems such as Chi-
cago's. Bargaining is forced on the courts by the crush of defendants." Chgo.
Sun Times, May 7, 1971 at 3, col. 3.
15. See generally Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence,
34 IND. L.J. 477 (1959).
16. Note the typical campaign promises of political candidates for the elective
State's Attorney office that they will "get" the crime syndicate, dope peddlers,
rioters, etc., and restore "law and order."
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cial officials to perform his duties effectively. The effect of politics on the
prosecutor's conduct is illustrated by the growing criticism in the news-
papers and mass media of various prosecutors for their "grandstanding"
tactics in making arrests and achieving convictions. 17 Does the success
of having a ninety-seven percent conviction rate' s imply that "justice
is being done" or that votes are being won? In addition to the "vote
getting" influence, 19 there is the additional problem of "machine" poli-
tics, 20 and intra-office politics.21 These many varied influences signifi-
cantly affect the prosecutor's decision making process. Of these influ-
ences, many are non-objective, if not totally subjective. Some are desir-
able and some are not. As will be demonstrated there are few restraints
on these influences and little chance for review in cases of abuse.
SOURCE OF THE POWER
The first inquiry into any power should be an analysis of its source.
Was it created by statute, constitution, executive policy, case law, or does
it merely exist as implied and incidental to some other power or duty?
A detailed inquiry into this area would require a lengthy discussion, which
for the analytical purposes here can be satisfied by a comparison of a few
of the state and federal policies. Most statutes, such as that of Illinois,
22
simply provide that the duty of the state's attorney:
shall be (1) to commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecu-
tions, civil and criminal, in any court of record in his county, in which the people
of the state or county, may be concerned. 2 3 (emphasis added)
(2) To institute and prosecute all actions and proceedings in favor of or for the
17. The Chicago newspapers are presently having a "field day" criticizing
State's Attorney Edward Hanrahan and Illinois Bureau of Investigation Chief
Mitchell Ware. Ware was severely criticized for taking television cameramen and
reporters on a mass "round-up" of drug offenders and those possessing illegal
weapons in Southern Illinois. See generally Chicago Daily News, Chicago Sun
Times, and Chicago Tribune, April, 1971.
18. The claim of Mitchell Ware in defense of the criticism of his methods see
note 17 supra, Chicago Daily News.
19. For an interesting comment of the effect on State's Attorney Hanrahan's
political future, see Hanrahan Politically Dead: Say Key Dems, Chicago Daily
News, Aug. 25, 1971 at 1, col. 4.
20. For an interesting survey of the problem see Chicago Tribune Task Force
Report, May 15-22, 1971. See County Criminal Courts Ruled by Sports System,
Chicago Tribune, May 16, 1971, at 1, col. 4. See also MOLEY, POLITICS AND
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (1929).
21. For further discussion, see text accompanying infra note 48.
22. See appendix for a brief summary of Illinois laws on the subject.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (1969).
use of the state, which may be necessary in the execution of the duties of any
state officer.
24
(12) To attend to and perform any other duty which may, from time to time, be
required of him by law. 25
This language is mote or less typical of the legislative direction for the du-
ties and conduct of its prosecutor, i.e., state's attorney.
The federal rules are equally as general and indefinite by defining the
duties of the district attorney as simply to: "(1) prosecute for all of-
fenses against the United States; (4) . . . unless satisfied on investiga-
tion that justice does not require the proceeding."' 26  At this point it
should be noted that both the Illinois and Federal rules state all offenses
or actions are to be prosecuted. The intent of the legislature, as evidenced
by these statutes, is that the prosecutor, as representative of the people,
should prosecute all violators of the law. The duties and conduct of the
prosecutor, as set forth in the statute, 27 say nothing about compromise or
adjustment, bargaining with defendants, and mediation in quarrels or
crime prevention. 28  A literal reading of the statutory authorization im-
plies that one might expect the prosecutor to prosecute all crimes against
all violators. A reading of the statute confirms this, because nowhere
is there an express affirmative provision for prosecutorial discretion.
Viewing most statutes or code provisions as directory, i.e., affirma-
tively by mandate or negatively by prohibition, one can reasonably as-
sume that the "discretionary power" arose through court interpretation.
Courts throughout the country have interpreted statutes so as to permit
substantial and rather unrestrained descretion in the decision of whether
or not to prosecute, 29 and generally, hold that the prosecutor is "vested"
with broad discretion to protect the public from crime both by statute"0
and by the authority existing at common law. 31 At common law the
prosecuting attorney had absolute control of the criminal prosecution.
3 2
He was charged by law with a substantial amount of discretion in prose-
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 4 (1969).
25. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1964).
27. Supra notes 23-26.
28. See Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
770 (1933).
29. See generally Annot., 155 A.L.R. 11 (1945). See also DAvis, supra note 6,
and La Fave supra note 7 for further discussion.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1964).
31. Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
32. Wilson v. County of Marshall, 257 Il. App. 220 (1930).
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cuting offenders and could commence public prosecutions in his official
capacity or discontinue them, when in his judgment, the ends of justice
were satisfied.A3 His conduct and acts were not purely ministerial, but
were held to involve a large measure of discretion as a minister of justice.3 4
In fact, the whole area of the accusatorial process is characterized by
relatively unbridled official discretion.3  From the time a crime is re-
ported or observed until (and if) an accused is arrested, charged, jailed
or the case is otherwise disposed of, the officials of the government have
broad discretion.30
The sources of prosecutorial discretionary power thus derive from:
(1) the implication of statutes; (2) the common law; (3) ambiguous
substantive criminal laws-laws that are often inconsistent, overlapping,
confusing, complex and archaic; and (4) intentional legislative over-gen-
eralization resulting in vagueness, lack of specificity, and over-generaliza-
tion designed to prevent the use of legal loopholes. Thus, without guide-
lines, the enforcement agencies can choose any of several laws to prosecute
or interpret any one statute to suit their case at hand. The purpose of
broad general laws is to aid the prosecutor in difficult situations and to
prevent a defendant from escaping due to some technical loophole or
lack of ability of the drafter of the law. This "sword," however, can cut
both ways.
The general arguments in favor of this discretion of the police and prose-
cutor before trial are generally based on the rationale that discretion is
necessary. If a prosecutor or the police were bound by strict guidelines
or standarized criteria in decision making, a greater injustice would
result because of the tremendous burden on the courts, rather than pro-
secutor, to decide the borderline or "grey-area" cases. Discretion is thus
necessary to quickly dispose of the obviously faulty case.3 7 The argu-
33. People v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 12 Ill. App. 263 (1883).
34. People v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 120 N.E. 244 (1918).
35. See Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REv. 904 (1962).
36. See generally LA FAVE, ARREST; THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY, 72-73 (1965); SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 233-34 (1966); Gold-
stein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility De-
cisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Kadish, supra
note 35, at 909-13.
37. The argument that absolute discretion is necessary is rebutted by a com-
parison to the West German system, where the discretionary power of prosecutors is
so slight as to be almost nonexistent; almost everything they do is closely super-
vised. "The most important difference being that: whenever the evidence that the
defendant has committed a serious crime is reasonably clear and the law is not in
doubt, the German prosecutor, unlike the American prosecutor, is without discre-
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ment continues that "if he (the prosecutor) had a thousand problems no
two will be exactly alike."'38 Discretion thus permits the early disposition
and screening of cases in which the accused is apparently innocent, or, for
other reasons to be discussed, the case would be a waste of time and
money to pursue.
In addition to the argument of earlier disposition and screening, the
prosecutor should have the discretion based on the particular facts before
him to decide (1) whether the suspect should be charged at all, and (2)
if so, with what offense or offenses should he be charged. This power of
discretion is necessary in order to allow the prosecutor a choice of weap-
ons sufficiently flexible to cover any single course of conduct.8 9 Even
if criminal laws were framed with exquisite specifications, it would still
be necessary for the human beings who administer the criminal laws to
exercise judgment.40  With the tools at hand it appears that discretion is
forced upon the prosecutor:
because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives
complaints. . . . What every prosecutor is practically required to do is select the
cases for prosecution and select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the
public harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.4 1
FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE
Possessing (1) the power to abstain from prosecution, and (2) the
power to selectively prosecute, the prosecutor must base his decision on
certain criteria. For analytical purposes, however, these two should be
distinguished, dependent upon the parties involved or affected. The dis-
cretion to abstain from prosecution is primarily the concern of the gen-
eral public while the power to selectively prosecute is the direct concern
of the defendant and involves issues of equal protection. 42  This prob-
tionary power to withhold prosecution. This means that selective enforcement, a
major feature of the American system, is almost wholly absent from the German
system. When a doubt seems to require a discretionary choice, the German
prosecutor does not resolve the doubt; he almost always presents a doubtful case to
the judge, who determines the sufficiency of the evidence and the proper inter-
pretation of the law. In America, the prosecutor makes the choice whether doubt-
ful or not." DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-90, 224-25 (1969) as cited in HALL
and KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1969) at 755. See also DAVIs, supra
note 6.
38. Supra note 28, at 772.
39. See generally Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection,
42 YALE L.J. 1 (1932).
40. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 290-91 (1968).
41. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 5 (1940). Com-
pare the West German system where there is little discretion. See supra note 37.
42. Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints,
42 S. CAL. L. REV. 519, 521 (1969).
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lem will arise again concerning abuse of discretion and its remedies. The
factors to be discussed also involve the selection of the criminal charge.4 3
Basically, the prosecutor bases his decision to prosecute on both sub-
jective and objective factors. Subjective factors usually involve the ques-
tion: "Will justice be done by my decision?" Objective factors involve
the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the accused.
In practice these factors, i.e., subjective and objective, are not distin-
guished, but for purpose of discussion and analysis, a few examples should
be set out to illustrate the complexity of the decision and factors involved
in arriving at it.
The President's Commission 44 has suggested several factors that may
be weighed in determining whether to adopt a non-criminal disposition.
They include such factors as:
(1) the seriousness of the crime;
(2) the effect upon the public sense of security and justice if the offender were
to be treated without criminal conviction;
(3) the place of the case in effective law enforcement policy where deterrent
factors may loom large, e.g., tax evasion, white collar crimes, first conviction juve-
nile offenses;
(4) whether the offender has medical, psychiatric, family, or vocational difficulties;
(5) whether there are agencies in the community capable of dealing with his
problem;
(6) whether there is reason to believe that the offender will benefit from and
cooperate with a treatment program;
(7) what the impact of criminal charges would be upon the witnesses, the of-
fender, and his family.4 5
These somewhat collateral and subjective factors should be distinguished
from objective evidentiary factors because they involve personal, ethical,
and moral considerations while an evidentiary factor is more "legal" in
that it involves the consideration of express legal standards, e.g., admissi-
bility of evidence. Note that these subjective factors will again come into
play in the area of selecting the appropriate charge, in plea bargaining,
and in sentence recommendation. These factors alone-although there
is no evidence to prove it-could be the basis for the decision to prosecute
or not. One of the major problems in the area of potential abuse of dis-
cretion involves this exact question, i.e., whether any decision should be
totally subjective.
43. See generally Ferguson, Formulation of Enjorcement Policy: An Anatomy
of the Prosecutor's Discretion Prior to Accusation, 11 RUTGERs L. REV. 507
(1957).
44. Supra note 11.
45. Supra note 11.
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In some cases the invocation of the criminal process against the margi-
nal offender may do more harm than good. What will the effect be of
bringing charges against an offender burdened by economic, physical,
mental, or educational disadvantages? Will the effect on the accused be
an injustice outweighing any benefit of his punishment? To label a person
as a criminal may set in motion a course of events that will increase the
probability of his becoming or remaining a criminal. The attachment of
the stigma of criminality may be so prejudicial as to ruin the future of the
offender by foreclosing what legitimate opportunities he may have had.4 6
The courts have generally affirmed the prosecutor's discretionary power
to determine whether the prosecution shall be commenced or maintained
on matters of public policy wholly apart from any question of probable
cause.
47
Objective considerations involve such questions as: (1) is there suf-
ficient evidence to win; (2) is there sufficient evidence to prove the case
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
charged; (3) will the witness be available and cooperate; (4) what is the
strength of the defendant's case; (5) what will be the probable result
based on the knowledge of or expectation of the judge or jury; (6) are
there any alternative remedies available?
These questions, although subjective also, involve the application of the
prosecutor's legal experience and education to the given legal possibili-
ties. These factors involve the question of "legal sufficiency" whereas
the previously mentioned subjective factors involve moral or ethical con-
siderations. The "objectivity," however, is an elusive standard for which,
at present, there are no express tests or guidelines to follow.
A prosecutor's office which has guidelines or express criteria for de-
termining (1) whether to prosecute and (2) what charge to select is the
exception rather than the rule. The Los Angeles County District Attorney
has compiled a list of reasons for refusing to file a complaint which may
aid our discussion at this point. 48 Reasons for refusal are:
(1) Departmental policy
(2) No Corpus Delecti
(a) no specific intent
(b) no criminal act
46. For a further discussion see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11.
47. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965). Compare to Cates, Can We Ignore Laws?-A Discretion Not to
Prosecute, 14 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1961); Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy
For the District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
48. See generally, supra note 42.
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(3) No connecting evidence
(a) a statement problem
(b) witness problem
(c) physical evidence problem
(4) Insufficient evidence
(a) facts weak
(b) evidence not available
(c) incomplete investigation
(d) witnesses not available
(e) evidence inadmissible
1. illegal detention
2. fruit of the poisoned tree
3. search warrant problem
4. search & seizure problem
5. warrant of arrest
6. Miranda plus
(5) Lack of jurisdiction




(8) Interest of justice. 49
The prosecutor's office does not usually have an express policy concern-
ing offenses not to prosecute, but may informally have a policy not to
prosecute certain types of offenses. The President's Commission suggests
that the following are offenses not likely to be prosecuted:
(1) domestic disturbances;
(2) assaults and petty thefts in which the victim and offender are in a family or
social relationship;
(3) statutory rape when both the boy and girl are young;
(4) first offense car thefts, the "joyride";
(5) checks drawn upon insufficient funds;
(6) first offense shoplifting, particularly where restitution is made;
(7) where the criminal acts involve offenders suffering from emotional disorders
short of legal insanity;
(8) cases involving annoying or offensive behavior other than a dangerous or
serious crime, e.g., drunkeness, disorderly conduct, minor assault, vagrancy, and
petty theft. 50
These factors, even if not expressly set down, generally appear to have an
informal effect on the prosecutorial decision.
The prosecutor, while considering these preceding factors-the weight
49. Supra note 42 at 531.
50. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 5-8.
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of the evidence, the nature of the crime, the nature of the defendant, etc.-
must also consider what the probable outcome will be when and if he goes
to trial. A recent empirical study has shown that judges acquit the de-
fendant for the same reasons juries do. 51 Juries may acquit the defend-
ant for the following reasons:
(1) they sympathize with the defendant as a person;
(2) they apply personal attitudes as to when self defense should be recognized;
(3) they take into account the contributing fault of the victim;
(4) they believe the offense is de minimis;
(5) they take into account the fact that the statute violated is an unpopular law;
(6) they feel the defendant already has been punished enough;
(7) they feel the defendant was subjected to improper police or prosecution tactics;
(8) they refuse to apply strict liability statutes to inadvertent conduct;
(9) they apply their own standards as to when mental illness or intoxication
should be a defense;
(10) they believe the offense is accepted conduct in the subculture of the defendant
and victim.5
2
The informality and lack of express control on the discretion of the
prosecutor are best described in the words of a prosecutor:
Although many different assistants made decisions as to whether to prosecute
different cases, there tended to be a strong consensus as to which cases should and
which should not be prosecuted. This was due to several factors: the assistants
shared a common perception of their role; each new assistant had been taught the
standards for prosecution by the other, more experienced hands; assistants often
discussed their decisions and asked the advice of each other; and finally, prosecu-
torial decisions were constantly being checked by the litigative process. 53
This reflection tends to indicate the void of express departmental policies.
As a generality, this learning process and informal policy standard are fol-
lowed nationwide.
The prosecutor above related that there are two basic questions to be
answered before initiating prosecution. The first is whether the prosecutor
believed the defendant was guilty. 54 It has been suggested that the
51. See NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL, ch. 9-12, 14 (1966). Compare to the CHICAGO CRIME COMMIS-
SION, ANNUAL REPORT 1970-CRIME TRENDS 1971, which found the conviction
rate by juries to be 85% while the conviction rate by judges acting without juries
was less than 50%.
52. KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, ch. 15-27 (1966).
53. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174,
177 (1965). The implication of this statement is that there is really no standard
except those set individually or as a group.
54. Id. at 178.
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majority, if not all, felt that it was morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one
was personally convinced of his guilt. Of course, to reach this decision, the as-
sistant might rely on much more than the evidence he could introduce at trial.55
The second major question is whether "in light of the habits of the judges
and juries in the area, the case could be expected to result in a convic-
tion. . . ...5 In this regard "prosecution would almost never be com-
menced unless the chances of success seemed better than fair." 57  As-
sistants viewed this conviction rate as important because by retaining a
high rate of convictions they encouraged guilty pleas, one of the principal
means of hoarding the scarce resources of the prosecutor's time and ef-
fort.58
In addition to these "governmental" factors, the prosecutor was influ-
enced by personal factors. "If the assistant making the decision expected
to try the case himself, his previous record-often a matter of status
within the office-would be at stake."'5 9 He also had to
be careful to stay in the good graces of the U.S. Attorney, who, holding essen-
tially a political position, was very sensitive to the criticism of the press, the
judges, and the defense bar, all of whom were quick to note a rising number of
acquittals and ascribe this to either incompetence in the staff or to overzealousness
in the choice of targets for prosecution. The feeling that it was important to
make certain that the office came under no undue criticism applied with addi-
tional force where the defendant was prominent in the community.6 0
These factors, although not readily admitted and most often denied by
most prosecutors, are a good example of the potential for abuse and mis-
carriage of the purpose for prosecutorial discretion. These factors exem-
plify conditions affecting the prosecutor's decision but have nothing to do
with the culpability of the defendant, the strength of the evidence, etc.
These types of factors are the most criticized and should be restricted or
defined in some way.6'
In weighing the lecision to prosecute, the prosecutor often looks to the
schedule of assignment for judges. When a judge who is known for light
55. Id. at 178. The unanswered question is "evidence concerning what?" Char-
acter, personality, moral convictions, religion, political beliefs, etc. The admission
that the prosecutor bases his decision on non-legal factors, i.e., subjective factors,
confesses to the potential for abuse that can follow. See discussion in text accom-
panying infra notes 59-66.




60. Id. at 181.
61. See County Criminal Courts Ruled by Spoils System, Chicago Tribune,
May 16, 1971, at 1, col. 4, for an example of the influence and effects of "politics"
within the prosecutor's office in Cook County.
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sentences is in a position to receive the pleas of guilty, the number of pleas
rise and the prosecutor can reasonably expect to terminate the prosecu-
tion without trial. 62  He would also have to judge the possibility that the
case might come before a judge who for one reason or another might be
unsympathetic to the police or prosecutor. 63
In addition to the personality of the judge, the prosecutor may be in-
fluenced by the defense attorney. A borderline case might be prose-
cuted if the defendant's attorney is an unskilled trial lawyer but declined
if the trial ability of the defendant's attorney is well known.6 4 However,
more important than abilities are the habits of the defense attorney.65
An assistant could consider whether the prospective defense attorney is
known to have his clients plead guilty, banking on the court's mercy, rath-
er than to hope for the benefit of the doubt from the jury.66 Where
the defense attorney has such a predisposition to pleading guilty, the
chances of successfully ending the case is further increased where a good
"deal" could be offered for such a plea. Hence, the availability of a sub-
stitute offense for one with a higher maximum sentence, or a promise of a
lighter sentence, or a charge of only one count where multiple counts are
available all contribute to the "bargain" in an effort to terminate the case
swiftly.
The preceding factors have been included at this point to emphasize
that generally there are no restrictions on what factors can be used to
make the decision to prosecute, how these factors should be weighed,
etc. These latent factors do not theoretically belong with the legitimate
factors, e.g., the matter of evidence, but they are recognized as salient
factors by most authorities. The problem will arise later with regard to
abuse, potential for abuse, and possible remedies.
At this point, one might conclude that the prosecutor has totally un-
bridled discretionary power. Within reasonable limits this is probably
true. The courts and legislature have not as yet come forth with any ef-
fective techniques to maximize the advantages of discretion and minimize
its potential for abuse. 67 Unlike the adjudicatory phases of the criminal
system where there are a plethora of safeguards, the courts have not ap-
plied due process or equal protection to the pre-accusation stage.68  The
62. Supra note 53, at 185.
63. Supra note 53, at 185.
64. Supra note 53, at 186.
65. Supra note 53, at 186.
66. Supra note 53, at 186.
67. See generally supra note 42.
68. See generally supra note 42.
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prosecuting attorney has several opportunities as the case develops to make
a discretionary decision.69  How he makes this decision is generally un-
controlled, except by his oath of office, 70 the canon of ethics for lawyers, 71
and his personal ethical and moral convictions.
The courts passing upon this question seem to agree that a duty rests
upon a prosecuting attorney to prosecute. "[B]ut this duty is not abso-
lute, but qualified, requiring of him only the exercise of a sound discre-
tion . . . wherever he, in good faith and thinks that a prosecution would
not serve the best interest of the state. .... ,,12 The state's attorney in his
official capacity is a representative of all the people, including the de-
fendant, and it is as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the defendant as those of any other citizen. 73  His duty is not only to se-
cure convictions but to see that justice is done. 74 His desire to win the case
should be subordinated to his duty to do justice, 75 for it is as much the
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that a person on trial is not deprived
of his statutory or legal rights as it is to prosecute him for the crime with
which he may be charged. 76 It is the duty of a prosecutor holding a
quasi-judicial position not only to prosecute the guilty but also to protect
the innocent. 77
CHALLENGING THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION
Within this broad framework of liberal discretionary power, on the one
hand, and the nebulous restrictions placed upon the prosecutor to protect
the guilty and innocent alike lies the crux of the problem. How can a
citizen, be he an accused or not, effectively stop the initiation of what may
be an unjustified prosecution, or force the prosecution to proceed or ini-
tiate action when it delays or refuses to proceed? At this point in time
there is no definite answer to either problem. To facilitate discussion,
the problem can be subdivided into questions of (1) forcing a prosecu-
69. See generally Klein, District Attorney's Discretion Not to Prosecute, 32
L.A. B. BULL. 323 (1957).
70. See e.g., ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 14, §§ 1, 4, 5 (1969).
71. See e.g., A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
72. See generally Annot., 155 A.L.R. 11 (1945).
73. People v. Oden, 20 Il1. 2d 470, 170 N.E.2d 582 (1960).
74. In re Guardianship of Angell, 26 Ill. App. 2d 239, 167 N.E.2d 711 (1960).
75. Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 857 (1966); Calo v. United States, 338 F.2d 793 (1st Cir. 1964); Griffin
v. United States, 183 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Pierce v. United States, 86
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1936).
76. People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914).
77. United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963).
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tion against the will of the prosecutor, (2) attempting to stop the prosecu-
tion after it has begun, or (3) altering the decision of the prosecutor in
some respect, e.g., as to the charge selected or sentence recommended,
etc. At a later time, the problem of specific remedies will be dis-
cussed. For present discussion purposes, a few general propositions
will be set out.
First, can an individual, after filing a complaint and objecting to the
prosecutor's inaction, go into court and force the prosecutor to prosecute?
The answer is generally no, a court will not force a prosecutor to prose-
cute. 78 The courts consistently have held that the disposition of all crimi-
nal action rests solely in the honest discretion of the prosecutor; if he
prosecutes or refuses to prosecute based on corrupt motives, the only
remedy is a collateral proceeding to remove him from office or to bring
criminal charges against him.79
Second, where there is a choice as to which of two applicable statutes
shall be the basis of the indictment, can the prosecution be forced to
choose the harsher or the lesser of the two? The answer is, again, that
the choice is solely discretionary with the prosecutor.80
Third, if a prosecutor will not bring or continue the action, can a pri-
vate individual take his place? The answer is, again, generally no, be-
cause the courts have held the prosecutor to be a quasi-judicial officer,
vested with the duty to protect the people and prosecute at the same
time.8' He is charged with seeing that no innocent man suffers as well
as seeing that no guilty man escapes. A private prosecutor, possibly, can-
not remain objective and unprejudiced as required in the interest of justice.
The individual is, however, not denied his vindictive remedy because
he can still go into the civil courts and sue for actual or nominal damages.
78. United States v. Cox, supra note 47; Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762
(D.D.C. 1963). Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Can the right of administrative review be extended to
prosecutorial conduct or nonaction as in Hardin? See also DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1970). Administrative review could be used to substantiate arguments sup-
porting the workability of review of discretion. See e.g., Wong Wing Hang
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, infra note 92.
79. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945).
80. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 894 (1965). Accord, Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970);
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359
F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Clemons v. United
States, 137 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943); Deutsch v. Aderhold, 80 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.
1935).
81. See Brower v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 49, 221 P. 1050 (1924); Comment,
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
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Fourth, can a person go into the federal courts to prevent or force a
prosecution? Again, the answer is no. The federal courts are powerless to
interfere with the prosecutor's discretionary power and cannot compel
him to prosecute a complaint or forego an action, whatever his reasons
for acting.8 2  There is a great reluctance historically for the courts, both
legal8 3 and equitable,84 to interfere with the organization and operation
of the other branches of the government.8 5 Public policy seems to re-
quire that public officers be protected" under the traditional doctrine of
separation of powers. As the Constitution has divided the government
into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, no branch may ex-
ercise any power properly belonging to another, except as expressly di-
rected or permitted.8 7
In addition to the reluctance to interfere with the executive branch,
some decisions have held that there is no remedy against the prosecutor
in any case. In Lawley v. Warren,88 the state's attorney, the first assistant
state's attorney, and the foreman of an Illinois grand jury, as a member
thereof, were, at the time of the return of the 'indictments against the
accused, "judicial officers"; as such, they were protected by the same
immunity applicable to judges, and an action could not be maintained
against them in the federal district court under the Civil Rights Act 89 on
the ground that they had wrongfully procured indictments against the
accused.90 By way of contrast, in actions for malicious prosecution,
courts have held that one wrongly accused does have a cause of action, the
theory being that it is the duty of the prosecutor to prosecute only those
whom he thinks may be guilty, and he exceeds his jurisdiction and loses
82. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also cases cited
infra note 91 and compare to Private Prosecution, infra note 92.
83. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (a proceeding in Mandamus).
84. Spies v. Byers, 287 I11. 627, 122 N.E. 841 (1919). Due to the historical
concept of separation of powers, the courts are prohibited from interfering with the
other branches of the government in the legitimate exercise of their powers. Id.
at 630, 122 N.E. at 842.
85. See generally Comment, supra note 42, at 521.
86. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of lte Office, 26 J. Crim.
L.C. & P.S. 647, 648 (1935).
87. See Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926) (Mandamus re-
fused for these reasons).
88. 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964); ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 8, art. 6, § 22.
90. See also Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 958 (1955). Peckam v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1957), a state's
attorney and judge were to be immune from a suit for damages and equitable re-
lief. Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962); Smith v. Dougherty, 286 F.2d
777 (7th Cir. 1961); Swift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
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his immunity when he deliberately and maliciously prosecutes without
cause. 91
CRITICISM AND POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
Prosecutorial discretion can be criticized for many reasons, the most
basic of which is that it is solely discretionary in nature. 92  Prosecutors
are limited only by "the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others."'9 ' The exercise of
such uncontrolled authority can be only as perfect as the human beings
who exercise it.94 Human beings by their nature are not always rational,
unbiased, and ethical. Without any controls or limitations, the exercise
of such power rests solely with the men possessing it. Within a society
which is cognizant of human shortcomings and which attempts to protect
itself by expressing as a societal political premise that "a government of
laws and not men" is to be the governing doctrine, the prosecutorial dis-
cretion appears as a red-flag exception. Nowhere is it more apparent
that our government is a government of men, and not laws, than in the
power and authority vested in the prosecutor. 5 With such power the
prosecutor could be described as "the most powerful official in local gov-
ernment."90
In effect, the consequence of unbridled prosecutorial discretion is that
the state's attorney has the power to choose his cases, and thus, can
choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prose-
cutor: the possibility that he "will pick the people that he thinks he
should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted."9
This potential for abuse becomes more intense with the current con-
troversey over military surveillance of civilians, F.B.I. wire tapping,
and the preparation of dossiers for persons with minimal notoriety:98
91. Leong v. Carden, 23 Hawaii 362 (1916); See also Carpenter v. Sibley,
153 Cal. 215, 94 P. 879 (1908); Parker v. Huntington, 7. Gray 36 (Mass. 1856);
Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 244, 105 N.W. 638 (1906). Contra, Watts v.
Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 228 P. 135 (1924).
92. See earlier discussion as to definition and scope of any discretionary power,
supra notes 5-8. But compare Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 360 F.2d 715 (2nd Cir. 1966) where "reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on record" was necessary.
93. "Discretion"--BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968), and sources cited
supra notes 5-8.
94. See Mills, The Prosecutor: Charging and Bargaining, U. ILL. L.F. 511, 512
(1966).
95. See generally supra note 28, at 771.
96. Supra note 28, at 771.
97. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 5 (1940).
98. See e.g. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY-COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
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With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a
fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of
almost everyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission
of the crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question
of picking a man and then searching the law books, or putting an investigation to
work, to pin some offense on him.9 9
Without expanding on this point at length, a great potential for abuse
is at once apparent. The very human elements of ambition, dishonesty,
greed, lust for power, laziness, and bigotry have room for development
within such a potential.10 0
The worst abuses of discretion occur in connection with those offenses
that are just barely taken seriously, such as consensual sex offenses. It is
here that a great possibility of abusive discretion exists-to pay off a
score, to provide a basis for extortion, or to stigmatize a defendant. 10 '
Vague statutes which are open for interpretation can be used to bring a
prosecution against almost anyone. Desuetudinal statutes, whose function
has long since passed, can be used to charge a person, subject him to the
time, expense, and delay of our criminal process, and cause him irrep-
arable bad publicity in the community.102
Continuous abuse of discretion "breeds general disrespect of the
law.' 03  It may create an atmosphere or condition "making easy the
arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive and unequal application" of the
laws.10 4  It creates a fertile bed for corruption "conducive to the de-
velopment of a police state-or at least, a police-minded state."' 10 5
DEFENSES AND REMEDIES FOR THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE
Within the present framework of prosecutorial discretion, there are two
basic methods of attacking an abuse by the prosecutor. The first is to
DOSSIERS (1971); Surveillance Surveyed, NEWSWEEK, Vol. 77, March 8, 1971, at 54;
The Bogg's File, NEWSWEEK, vol. 77, May 3, 1971, at 29; The Invisible Intruders,
SATURDAY REV., Vol. 54, Jan. 30, 1971, at 20; Miller, The Dossier Society, Chicago
Tribune, May 23, 1971, at 22.
99. Supra note 97, at 5.
100. "Also there is no office where an able and honest public servant can be
more effective." Supra note 95, at 771.
101. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION, 290-91 (1968).
102. See generally Benfield, The Abrogation of Penal Laws by Non-enforce-
ment, 49 IowA L. REv. 389 (1964) for defenses to such actions. Some examples of
such desuetudinal statutes are laws which forbid the sale of candy cigarettes, pro-
hibit kite flying, and ban the exhibition of films depicting a felony.
103. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427,
429 (1960).




defend against the charge within the criminal proceeding. The second is
to collaterally attack the proceeding or exercise of the discretion petition-
ing another court for injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus, a writ of pro-
hibition, a writ of habeas corpus, and so on. The two methods of relief
have been distinguished due to the differences in probability of success
of the method, the court's attitude as to the method chosen (e.g., the
courts are very reluctant to grant an injunction), the rights of the parties
affected, and who is in fact affected, i.e., one particular defendant or a
classification of defendants, such as Negroes. These two methods deal
with a direct attack or defense of the criminal action. They are com-
parable in that the same grounds would be asserted for defending the
action as would be used in seeking an injunction, mandamus, etc., but
they are distinguishable as to tactical methods.
Before discussing the two basic methods of collateral and direct de-
fense, it must be noted that there are potential actions against the in-
dividual prosecutor for abusing his discretion. If the conduct by the
prosecutor is criminal in nature, he may be subject to indictment. 10 6
The possibility of a criminal indictment is rare due to the inherent police
power of the prosecutor to use "reasonable" force or other methods in the
performance of his duties.
If the abuse involves obvious, flagrant, or unethical conduct on the part
of the prosecutor, the accused can sue civilly for actual or nominal dam-
ages under traditional tort law, e.g., malicious prosecution. These ac-
tions, however, necessitate going into court again-this time on the civil
side rather than criminal. Justice is not swift on the civil dockets and
usually no direct relief is obtainable for the burden of carrying on a de-
fense of the criminal action. This remedy, therefore, needs no further
mention. Suffice it to say, for the reasons to be stated later, that unless
the case is clearly exceptional, the wronged party still will not obtain ade-
quate relief for the trouble to which he was subjected.
In addition to the wrongfully accused having a civil cause of action,
the traditional remedies of impeachment, 10 7 suspension, or disbarment are
available for flagrant and gross abuses. These cases of abuse are unfor-
tunately common and include such situations as the prosecutor being dis-
106. See, e.g., Chicago Sun Times, May 17, 1971, at -, col. -, suggesting
that the State's Attorney, Hanrahan, and others should be indicted for a raid on
the residence of several Chicago Black Panthers. In fact, he and thirteen others
were indicted for obstructing justice on Aug. 28, 1971.
107. See DeLong and Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney, Provisions of Law
Organizing the Office, 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 926, 953-57 (1933).
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barred for taking money, refusing to prosecute, s08 splitting fees with a
defense attorney,10 9 failing to prosecute and losing or destroying files and
records to prevent further prosecution by another prosecutor, 110 or for
using his power to initiate prosecution to extort money, abandon claims,
and help a co-conspirator collect fees by threat of prosecution,"' and so
on ad nauseum. These situations, directly and blatantly involving abuse
of discretion, are distinct from the situation where the prosecutor simply
chooses to exercise his discretion in an arbitrary manner. Most cases
are borderline cases and this remedy would probably not be applicable.
The first basic method of relief is merely to defend the action, utilizing
as a defense the fact that discretionary abuse taints the action. This
method can best be covered within the context of traditional appellate re-
view procedures. Constitutional questions, denial of due process, equal
protection questions, etc., could be raised by a motion to dismiss," 2 a mo-
tion to quash," 3 a motion in arrest of judgment, a motion for a new trial,
or post conviction habeas corpus, or by going through the traditional ap-
pellate review. The problem inherent in this method is that it is slow,
expensive, and involves quite extensive legal work. In cases of harass-
ment or clear abuse, this method would not be adequate because the
prosecutor's object would be fulfilled, i.e., to drag the defendant through
the system. Note also that defenses of this type are usually available
only to those who can afford counsel. The poor or illiterate have to rely
on overworked public defenders or legal aid.
In addition to the effectiveness of direct defense, there is some dis-
agreement as to how the evidence of discriminatory enforcement may be
introduced. In People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.,"14 the court held that
the introduction of such evidence should not have been made to the jury
but rather to the court via a motion to dismiss or motion to quash, be-
cause the claim of discriminatory enforcement does not involve the ques-
108. People 'ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Anglim, 33 Colo. 40, 78 P. 687
(1904).
109. In re Lyons, 162 Mo. App. 688, 145 S.W. 844 (1912).
110. In re Simpson, 9 N.D. 379, 83 N.W. 541 (1900).
111. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922).
112. Moses v. Kennedy, supra note 78; People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16
App. Div. 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); People v. Paine Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d
824, 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1963); People v. Pam, 38 Misc. 2d 296, 238 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1963).
113. People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 852 (1960); People v. Winters,
171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200
N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964).
114. Supra note 112.
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tion of guilt or innocence of the defendant, which is the province of the
jury, but is a matter of law. The court recognized its validity as a de-
fense but reversed because of the erroneous manner in which it was raised.
The cases are divided on this issue, but it is sufficient at this time to recog-
nize that discretionary abuse is a defense, the only remaining question
being the manner in which it can be raised.115 This question will be
noted subsequently.
There are several circumstances in which abusive discretion is readily
apparent, at least to the accused. For example, what if a state or city
has an ordinance requiring that all laundries in wooden buildings be
licensed by a municipal board, but this board as a policy denied li-
censes to Chinese? The prosecutor has the duty to enforce "all" laws, stat-
utes, ordinances, etc., but he has the discretion to abstain for various
reasons, e.g., if he feels the law is unfair, discriminatory, unconstitu-
tional, too severe, etc. Assume that this is not the situation here, and
the prosecutor chooses not to prosecute these licensing violations, but he
chooses to prosecute only Chinese people who operate laundries in wooden
buildings without licenses issued by a board which probably would not
have issued the license to these people in the first place. What can a
Chinese person do in this situation?
The example above is the landmark 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins," 6 which established the principle that the equal protection clause
guarantee prohibits the discriminatory administration of statutes. Yick
Wo was denied a license but began operation of a laundry in a wooden
building without a license. At trial he offered to prove that two hundred
other Chinese were denied permits, while eighty non-Chinese were granted
them. The lower court held for the government, denying Yick Wo the de-
fense of discriminatory enforcement. The Supreme Court, instead of
voiding the ordinance because it provided insufficient standards and
put arbitrary power in the hands of the board, or getting into the real
cause of the problem, prosecutorial discretion, chose to hold the conviction
invalid because it discriminated against Chinese. The Court, although
having a perfect opportunity to set standards for such situations, did not
choose to limit discretionary power or interfere with the operation of the
other branches of the government. Instead, it wrote:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by a public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in
115. See for further discussion Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 393, 414 (1965).
116. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution." 7
This language does not set definite standards, but it does express the
principle that an accused has a defense to discriminatory enforcement.
How does one, after alleging discriminatory enforcement, prove it? The
answer appears to be unsettled and confused at this time. The burden is
placed entirely on the defendant, and the prosecution does not have to
allege or prove that it has acted in a nondiscriminatory manner. The
defendant's burden of proving discriminatory conduct is a heavy one;
moreover, there is uncertainty as to what specific evidence will suffice to
prove his allegation. It is unlikely that he will be able to obtain direct
proof, or amass other persuasive evidence sufficient to support any in-
ference of intent to discriminate. The courts have held that (1) it is in-
sufficient to show that other offenders have not been prosecuted; 118 (2)
that there has been a laxity of enforcement; 119 or (3) that there was suf-
ficient evidence of the existence of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion based on an unjustifiable standard of race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification. 120 In support of his contention of intentional discrimination,
and not mere laxity of enforcement, the defendant is entitled to introduce
evidence of nonenforcement as relevant to his contention.' 21 The burden
is still, however, on the defendant to establish by a clear preponderance
of the evidence that his contention is true.
This proof, i.e., that the defendant was selectively chosen to be prose-
cuted, does not necessarily mean that the "discrimination" against him is
unconstitutional. It may be justified when (1) the meaning or constitu-
tionality of the law is in doubt and a test case is needed to clarify the law
and establish its validity, or (2) a striking example or a few examples
are sought in order to deter other violators, as a part of a bona fide ra-
tional pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that general
compliance will follow and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary.
Although the courts are confused or hesitant at this time to set up a
definite standard, the principle has been established that discrimination,
if deliberate and intentional is violative of the equal protection clause. 122
117. Id. at 373-74.
118. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963).
119. Wade v. City & County of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d
181 (1947); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., supra note 112.
120. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.,
supra note 112.
121. People v. Harris, supra note 113.
122. See cases cited supra notes 117-20 and Edelman v. California, 344 U.S.
357, 359 (1953); Ab Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 506 (1905); Comment,
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This, coupled with the tendency in recent years to assure the defendant
in a criminal case that he cannot constitutionally be convicted if law en-
forcement officers dealt with him "unfairly" at any stage of the proceed-
ings, 123 leads to the general principle that if a defendant can prove dis-
criminatory conduct he may be able to gain a dismissal or acquittal of
the charges against him. Although the effectiveness of the defense of
prosecutorial discrimination is somewhat diluted by its present state of
uncertainty in the courts, it is nevertheless a weapon which should be em-
ployed to attempt to ward off a discriminatory prosecution.
At this point, the inherent problems of prosecutorial motive will be
considered. How does one prove motive? Is motive relevant? Can a
prosecutor's motive be a defense to discriminatory enforcement? Because
a prosecutor has the judicially approved power to make the decision to
prosecute based on a variety of factors, he can theoretically choose his
defendants. 124  Does the selective enforcement of the laws mean that
the prosecution is inherently discriminatory because a particular person
has been chosen to be prosecuted? Although enforcement statistics and
proof of substantial violations by others may establish partial or total
nonenforcement except against the individual involved, this would seem
insufficient to establish the necessary intent to discriminate.' 2  Attempts
to inferentially establish a possible motive for police discrimination have
failed.' 12
Is there an abuse of discretion where the primary motive of the prose-
cutor relates to matters other than the commission of the particular crime
for which the defendant is being prosecuted? 27  An example of such a
situation is where "prosecutions have been motivated by personal grudges
of public officials"' 28 toward an individual. Was James Hoffa singled
out for prosecution by the United States Attorneys because he told Robert
The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLo. L.
REv. 1103, 1108 (1961).
123. See e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., supra note 112. Compare
Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAuL. L. REv. 80 (1969).
124. See text accompanying supra footnotes 53-66.
125. See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 588 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940).
126. United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957) where the
defendant in a tax suit alleged he was singled out for prosecution because he was
suspected of other crimes; Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, infra
note 134, where personal animosity was alleged.
127. See generally Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecut-
ing Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-35 (1967).
128. Id. at 1035.
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Kennedy "that he was nothing but a rich man's kid who never had to earn
a nickel in his life.' 129 During Robert Kennedy's term as Attorney Gen-
eral "there were more prosecutions filed against James Hoffa than there
were civil rights cases in the entire state of Mississippi, and more prosecu-
tions against officers of the Teamster's Union than there were civil rights
cases in the entire country."'1 30
Consider also situations where a prosecutor makes repeated attempts
to convict an unpopular figure, such as Al Capone. If a prosecutor con-
siders that such a person is dangerous but cannot be successfully "put
away" for offenses he is suspected to have committed, is it ethical and
proper to search his past and prosecute him for anything that can be found,
e.g., income tax evasion? "Some prosecutors consider it proper to sub-
ject him [Al Capone] to prosecutions for a variety of other crimes, rang-
ing from traffic offenses to tax evasion, for which he would not be in-
vestigated and charged were it not for his notoriety.' 1 3 1
One extreme example is People v. Darcy,132 where the defendant, a
Communist, was convicted of perjury for statements made in an election
registration affidavit regarding the defendant's use of an assumed name
and incorrect place of birth. The court held that the evidence of non-
prosecution of hundreds of thousands of identical violators did not prove
discrimination. In fact, the common practice upon discovery of such
violations was to notify them by post card and ask them to correct the er-
ror. Furthermore, Darcy was extradicted from Pennsylvania, while thou-
sands of similar mistakes by others were not prosecuted at all.' 33 This
case and others13 4 indicate that motive is relevant, but proving motive
appears to be practically impossible.13 5  In light of the impracticality, if
not impossibility of proving prosecutorial motive, the method of direct
defense is an ineffective tool against discriminatory prosecution, unless
perhaps, the selective prosecution pattern reveals clear cut racial discrimi-
tion.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1035, n.25.
131. Id. at 1034.
132. 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943).
133. Id. at 358 (dissenting opinion).
134. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953), where defendant was con-
tinually prosecuted for espousing unpopular political and economic views in park
speeches when others were not prosecuted for the same conduct. United States v.
Lenske, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9686 (9th Cir. 1966); See also Society of Good Neigh-
bors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949).
135. Note the failure of Hoffa and Capone to even raise this defense because




Within the context of selective enforcement, equal protection, and
discrimination, are there methods more effective than direct defense to
ward off prosecutorial abuse? The equitable remedy of an injunction
would be clearly advantageous in such situations. 13 6 It permits (1) a
unique flexibility allowing "custom tailoring" to form the decree to fit
the situation, and (2) an adjudication of the charge prior to the crimi-
nal action, thus eliminating the risks involved in defending a prosecution
after the action has been initiated.13 7
Because injunctive relief is equitable in nature, the equitable require-
ments of an inadequate remedy at law, involvement of a property right,
and feasibility and practicality of enforcement, as well as the equitable
defenses must be considered. Due to the historical background of the ap-
plication of an injunction, there is a deep-rooted reluctance in the Anglo-
American legal system to permit its use in the criminal court process.
13 8
Reasons for this lie in equity's historical role: (1) it acts only to protect
property rights;' 3 9 (2) it will not act if there is an existing and adequate
remedy at law, i.e., in the actual defense of the criminal law action the
same ground for the injunctive relief can be asserted to bar the convic-
tion; 140 (3) it takes into consideration that the threat of an injunction
would hamper the performance and freedom of the government enforce-
ment agencies in fullfilling their duties; 14' (4) it fears that through an
injunction guilty persons would escape prosecution and flouting of the law
would be encouraged. 1 42
The type of injunction sought could present additional problems. If
the injuction is interlocutory, to maintain the status quo between the par-
ties until the trial on the merits, there probably would not be a general
136. Note, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 3 HARV. CIv. RirHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 67 (1967).
137. Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REV. 144
(1944).
138. On the question of the reasons for the reluctance to enjoin criminal
prosecutions, see generally Note, Equity: Enjoining Criminal Prosecutions, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 685 (1949), Note, Equity-Injunction Against Criminal Proceed-
ings, 31 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1932).
139. See generally Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402 (1818); KERR, INJUNC-
TIONS (2d ed. 1880).
140. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Cambell v. Medalie, 71 F.2d
671 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 592 (1934); Buffalo Gravel Corp. v.
Moore, 194 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1922).
141. See ex rel. Freebourn v. District Court, 85 Mont. 439, 279 P. 234 (1929).
142. See People v. Darcy, supra note 132; Society of Good Neighbors v. Van
Antwerp, supra note 134.
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resistance to issuance. An example might be to prevent police harrass-
ment until the first of a series of similar prosecutions is settled by the
criminal court. If the injunction sought is to be permanent, e.g., to never
prosecute the defendant, or mandatory, e.g., to require the prosecutor to
drop the specific charges, there would probably be a great reluctance
to issue the injunction. The type of injunction and what is sought by it
would thus greatly effect its chances of being granted.
As a general rule equity will not interpose to prevent prosecutions in
criminal courts. Equity will generally leave the person to his defense at
the trial and will not prejudge the case. 143 Equity will, however, protect
persons by restraining a prosecution when it is "necessary and incident"
to the protection of rights which equity recognizes. 144  Subject to the tra-
ditional equity conditions, injunctions have been granted to protect per-
sonal rights even if property rights are not involved. 145 Freedom, to be
sure, is a personal right, and therefore, it may be within the scope of
equitable protection.
The courts, however, remain divided on the applicability of injunctive
relief. It seems clear that the Constitution prohibits purposeful discrimi-
nation in the enforcement of the laws. A party who is the subject of such
discrimination may assert it to defeat prosecution, and in certain circum-
stances, he may enjoin its continuation. 146  Such relief "must be regarded
as an extraordinary rather than usual remedy. '' 147  It appears that if the
constitutionality of a statute is in question injunctive relief will be
granted.' 4s  In Downing v. California State Board of Pharmacy,'149 the
court by dictum stated: "If law enforcement officers attempt to enforce
143. See Ferguson v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S.W. 472 (1914); People
v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 190 Cal. 624, 213
P. 945 (1923), where the court denied injunctive relief contending that there is an
adequate remedy at law by appeal to the governor for a pardon. Whether such a
remedy is in fact adequate, as these courts assume, is highly questionable.
144. Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
145. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
146. The Supreme Court has stated that if a continuing threat of discriminatory
enforcement is shown then an injunction would be granted. Two Guys From
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588 (1961), (but the Court
declined to grant the injunction because the question was moot).
147. The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, supra
note 122.
148. See Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963); City of Evansville v.
Gaseteria, 51 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931); Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d
337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947); Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040
(1933).
149. 85 Cal. App. 2d 30, 36, 192 P.2d 39, 42 (1948).
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a criminal statute arbitrarily and in a discriminatory manner, such action
may be restrained by the courts."'15  The courts, however, deny injunc-
tive relief in similar situations for such reasons as: (1) the person must
come into equity with clean hands in order to be entitled to relief and
since a violator of a statute does not have "clean hands," he is not en-
titled to the injunction;15' (2) there is an adequate remedy at law;'5 2
(3) no property right is involved; 153 (4) certain procedural requirements
are not satisfied, such as pleadings which are not stated with precision
and certainty.'5 4  Some courts have gone so far as to hold that the de-
fense of discriminatory enforcement is available only where violations
were relatively minor, being merely malum prohibitum, 55 and not for
an offense malum in se. 15 6 The boundaries thus appear to remain un-
delineated with the probable weight against granting an injunction.
The federal courts, on occasion, have granted injunctive relief against
prosecution and threats of prosecution. In Dombrowski v. PJister,157 for
example, the Supreme Court held that an injunction against the enforce-
ment of certain state criminal statutes could properly issue. The facts of
that case demonstrated that the plaintiffs, members of a civil rights group
in Louisiana, were subjected to harassment and threats of prosecution
by state officials to discourage them from exercising their constitutional
rights. However, in a recent series of cases' 58 the Supreme Court tight-
150. However, the court found this not to be the case and reversed the order
granting an injunction.
151. See Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, supra note 134; 28 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1964).
152. Supra note 140 and 143.
153. See Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 366 Ill. 474, 9 N.E.2d 213
(1937).
154. Id.; Highland Sales Corp. v. Vance, 244 Ind. 20, 186 N.E.2d 682 (1962);
28 AM. JuR. Injunctions § 265 (1959).
155. People v. Harris, supra note 113; People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959) (both for gambling).
156. People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943) (for perjury);
People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (1941) (for pandering).
157. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
158. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971). See also Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F.
Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971). The prosecutor, Garrison, had brought charges
against Shaw of conspiring to assassinate President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted
at the trial, but Garrison subsequently sought an indictment for perjury based upon
Shaw's testimony at his trial. Shaw then petitioned the federal district court for an
injunction restraining Garrison from prosecuting him. The court granted the re-
quested relief, finding that the prosecutor was acting in bad faith, and that if relief
were withheld Shaw would suffer irreparable harm from multiple litigation and har-
assment.
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ened the reins of the Dombrowski doctrine, and strongly indicated that
in the area of state criminal enforcement, federal abstention should be
the rule and not the exception.
The writ of prohibition is another possible remedy for the abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. As yet there are no cases where it has been used
to bar a criminal prosecution. A writ of prohibition is used only in cases
of extreme necessity where the grievance cannot be redressed by ordi-
nary proceedings at law, in equity, or by appeal. 1 9 It is generally used
as a command to an inferior court, ordering it to cease the prosecution of
an action for the reason that the action or some collateral matter arising
therein is not within its jurisdiction.' 60 The reluctance of the courts to
grant the writ makes the use of this writ unfeasible except in extreme
emergencies.
Another possibility for relief is mandamus, a command by a court to
a public official to do a particular act. In situations where the prosecutor
refuses to prosecute, or desires to enter a nolle prosequi, or has dropped
the charges where there is sufficient evidence to go to trial, a writ of
mandamus can be used to engender an immediate judicial determination.
The courts, however, have refused to issue a writ of mandamus for the
reason that in the matters of investigation and prosecution the prosecutor's
power is discretionary and beyond the control of the court.161 Ordinarily,
officers clothed with the discretion as to the manner of performing a duty
cannot be required to perform it in a particular manner, but may be
compelled by mandamus to act.162 Mandamus will not lie to regulate a
general course of official conduct' 63 or to enforce the performance of the
official's duties so as to prevent further violations of laws which it is that
official's duty to enforce.164 Thus, it appears that mandamus may be
used to compel the exercise of a discretionary duty or power but not the
way in which the officer shall exercise the discretion." 5 Also, in the ab-
sence of a clear abuse of discretion, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued
159. See e.g., Niagra Falls Power Co. v. Halpin, 45 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424, 181
Misc. 13, 16 (1943); State ex rel. Levy v. Savord, 143 Ohio St. 451, 453-54, 55
N.E.2d 735, 736 (1944).
160. Alexander v. Crollott, 199 U.S. 580 (1905).
161. Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813, 815
(1960).
162. Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
163. People ex rel. Bartlett v. Busse, 238 I11. 593, 87 N.E. 840 (1909) (to en-
force Sunday closing laws).
164. Id.
165. Gustafson v. Wethersfield Township High School Dist. 191, 319 Il. App.
255, 49 N.E.2d 311 (1943).
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to compel performance of prosecutorial duties when the prosecutor has
demonstrated a reasonable exercise of his discretion. 166 The ultimate
question, then, is what is a "clear abuse" and what is a "reasonable" exer-
cise? The courts have held that mandamus will not lie to compel the
prosecutor to prosecute every charge of a crime that may be made by an
individual desiring the prosecution of a third person.167 The courts have
rationalized that nothing could be more demoralizing to "efficient ad-
ministration of the criminal law in our system of justice than to require
the prosecutor to dissipate its efforts in personal grievances, fanciful
charges, and idle prosecutions.' 168 Just as a court cannot compel a prose-
cutor to prosecute, it cannot compel him to institute a suit against his will
and judgment.169
Court decisions have denied interference with the prosecutor's deci-
sion of whether to charge, and after charging, whether to prosecute.
Suppose, for example, that the prosecutor did charge, did prosecute and is
in a position to recommend a sentence to the judge. Can mandamus or
injunction force him to seek the maximum sentence or the minimum sen-
tence? The answer appears to be no for the same reason as before, i.e.,
the courts will not interfere with the reasonable exercise of an official's
discretion. There appear to be no cases on point so the question will be
one of first impression if and when it arises.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN PLEA-BARGAINING, ITS EFFECT
ON THE SYSTEM
The topic of plea bargaining is intentionally left until last because this
area best exemplifies the subject of this comment, i.e., that changing cir-
cumstances compel a re-evaluation of the prosecutorial discretion. The
rationale of the previous areas of discretion, e.g., the decision to prose-
cute or not, also imply that the potential for abuse is great, but the courts
have not chosen to limit plea bargaining as yet. It becomes readily appar-
ent:
that the available safeguards are only barely if at all, sufficient to protect due
process when the prosecutor bargains with the defendant. The potentials and mo-
166. People ex rel. Strozier v. Kennelly, 342 Ill. App. 515, 97 N.E.2d 126
(1951).
167. Supra note 161, at 755, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
168. Supra note 161, at 755, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
169. Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 34 P. 707 (1893). Note the possibility in
such situations of the use of qui tam actions where a person could sue in or on the
behalf of the state or people.
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tives for abuse are present and all that remains is the opportunity; in the absence
of more effective protections, that opportunity may all too often knock.1 70
The practice of plea bargaining has created not only the opportunity for
abuse as stated above but it appears to have tainted the whole area of
criminal justice.
Few practices in the system of criminal justice create a greater sense of
unease and suspicion than the negotiated plea of guilty. 17 1 Such a device
tends to raise a doubt or question as to the quality of criminal justice that
results from such a bargain. It has been stated that:
[tihe rule for the administration of the criminal law provides that all offenders
should be treated equally. No defendant should receive more or less punishment
than another who committed a similar offense and the rich and powerful should be
prosecuted as vigorously as the poor and weak.172
In the practice of plea bargaining, equality seems to have been lost in
the shuffle. The defendant with a high paid, well-known criminal law-
yer has a far better chance of receiving more in return for his guilty plea
than a poor, black, uneducated person defended by the over-worked
public defender, who often knows nothing more about the case than what
he has seen in the file a few minutes before trial.
The crush of cases on the courts has made plea bargaining "virtually
necessary to prevent the collapse of criminal justice in the overloaded
metropolitan court systems."'1 73 This continuing crush of cases has
changed the principal role of criminal court judges and prosecutors from
trial conductors to bargaining brokers. 174 Our system of criminal justice
has come to depend upon a steady flow of guilty pleas.175  There are
simply not enough judges, prosecutors, or defense counsels to operate a
system in which defendants must go on trial. 176
There are three major types of plea bargaining devices: (1) sentence
recommendation, (2) a guilty plea to a lesser included offense, and (3)
the dismissal of charges for certain considerations, such as a promise to
become a prosecution witness.' 77 These three devices are designed to
170. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 464 (1969).
171. Bargaining Forced on the Courts by the Crush of Defendants, Chicago
Sun Times, May 7, 1971, at 32, col. 1, quoting from the 1967 PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
172. Supra note 28.
173. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 3.
174. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 1.
175. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT
(1967).
176. Id.
177. Supra note 170, at 459.
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give the prosecutor the latitude to deal with most circumstances in order to
see that "justice is done." The fundamental purposes of sentencing are:
(1) punishment, (2) rehabilitation, and (3) deterrence. How do the
devices available and the purpose of sentencing square-up under the pres-
ent system? The answer is not well.
No defendant should bargain for a plea if he is in fact innocent of the charges.
Therefore, the assumption is that all defendants who bargain should be in fact
guilty. Yet the bargaining defendant is likely to receive a lighter sentence than the
defendant who goes to trial. Knowing this, is not the defendant who prefers to go
on trial, but fears the harder sentence, indirectly coerced into pleading guilty?
If so, is not his constitutional right to a trial being abridged? 178
Our adversary system of criminal justice is designed so that the prosecutor
prosecutes, the defendant defends, and the judge or jury decides who is
more persuasive. Hopefully, from the evidence and testimony of both
sides justice will be the ultimate result. What is the practical effect on this
adversary system of a defendant who pleads guilty and a judge who "rub-
ber stamps" the prosecutor's sentence recommendation? The practical
effect appears to be that there are not three legally distinct, separate
parties.
When a prosecutor grants a concession in exchange for a plea of guilty,
he may be acting in any or all of several different roles, which are:
(1) administrative-to dispose of each case in the fastest, most efficient man-
ner in interest of getting his and the courts' work done,
(2) advocate-to maximize the number of convictions and the severity of sen-
tences imposed after conviction,
(3) judge-to do right things in view of the defendant's social circumstances or in
view of peculiar circumstances of his crime arguing that this is accom-
plished with a guilty plea,
(4) legislator-granting concession because the law is too harsh not only for
this defendant but all defendants. 179
A guilty plea is intended to take into account the purpose of sentencing,
i.e., punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence. If a particular defendant
deserves a lesser sentence, then the court should consider mitigating cir-
cumstances to reduce the sentence. In the practice of plea bargaining
there is:
[t]he implicit belief that a guilty plea is a showing of the defendant's rehabilitive
potential and therefore justifies a less severe sentence, or that a defendant deserves
considering for speeding the administration of justice, may result in penalizing the
defendant who 'hinders' justice by pleading not guilty. To 'hinder' justice in this
sense is to demand one's constitutional right to trial by the court or jury. To delay
178. Supra note 170, at 460.
179. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Ci. L. REv.
50 (1968).
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the administration of justice means to place yet another case on the court's al-
ready crowded docket. In effect, it is the defendant who is being penalized, not
only for the assertion of a right given him by the state itself, but also for the
state's own inefficiency and penury in the administration of justice.' 8 0
It is doubtful that this effect is consonant with the spirit of the adversary
system.
The scope of plea bargaining in the criminal courts is exemplified by a
few statistics. A few years ago, it was stated that:
Not including the cases dismissed by the prosecutor on his own motion, approxi-
mately 70-80% of all remaining defendants plead guilty. Ordinarily, this decision
is based on negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense counsel, and the
defendant usually pleads guilty to a lesser offense than those originally charged.' 81
In 1970, in Cook County, only 870 cases were settled by a bench or jury
trial. More than four times as many defendants-3,693 of them---elected
to plead guilty in negotiated settlements. 182 This has led to a situation
known as "bargain day"--the period at the end of the month when some
judges hand out light sentences to spruce up their case disposition rec-
ords.1 3 Both defendants and defenses attorneys know that for a lenient
sentence the best time to confront the judge would be at the month's
end.'8 4 As to whether this is proper, a former assistant state's attorney
has stated: "It's wrong when the ends of justice are not truly served.
But it is right in the sense that another case has been disposed of and the
court system has moved another case away from potential collapse."'u8
In view of this, the guilty plea practice is justified because it is certain in
result, saves the state time and expense, and frees the energy of the
prosecutor for the investigation of other crimes and the trial of highly
important cases.' 8 6
A theoretical threat of collapse hangs over the criminal court system.
This threat is illustrated by a recurring bad dream experienced by one
prosecutor. In the dream, each prisoner awaiting trial in County Jail
exercises his right to request an immediate jury trial. In the event such
mass requests occurred, the court system would collapse within 120 days-
the statutory time limit for meeting such trial demands. An estimated two
out of three prisoners making such requests would have to be freed be-
cause the courts could not accommodate their case. 187
180. Supra note 170, at 461.
181. HALL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I1 (1965).
182. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 2.
183. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 2.
184. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 2.
185. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 2.
186. Supra note 28, at 787.
187. Supra note 171, at 32, col. 2.
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The secondary effect of plea bargaining is a lessening of respect for the
law by all citizens. Robbery by a lethal weapon is a serious offense in
all jurisdictions, and carries a severe penalty. "Imagine the surprise (and
contempt) of the person robbed when he learns that his assailant served
a few months in jail or paid a fine for assault."' 8 8  The attitude of the
public and respect for the law are surely tainted. In a survey on "What
Ails American Justice," seventy-five percent of those polled felt that
convicted criminals are let off too easily.' 8 9  Sixty-eight percent felt the
accused people are not brought to trial promptly. 19 0 Forty percent of the
people felt that lenient judges are the blame for crime.' 9 ' Sixty-two per-
cent felt that letting criminals off too easily is more disturbing than
the prospect that constitutional rights may be inadequately protected.'
92
Despite the potential abuses inherent in plea bargaining, the Supreme
Court, in the recent case of North Carolina v. Alford,19 3 apparently
acquiesced in this procedure. Defendant Alford, originally charged with
first-degree murder, later accepted the prosecutor's offer of pleading
guilty to a reduced charge, second-degree murder. Subsequently, defend-
ant brought a habeas corpus action, contending that his guilty plea was
induced by fear and coercion. The Court's failure to grant Alford the re-
quested habeas corpus relief signaled that plea bargaining will be toler-
ated, if not encouraged by our nation's highest tribunal in the future.
CONCLUSION
If plea bargaining, as has been indicated, is symptomatic of an ailing
system of criminal justice, how does this relate to prosecutorial discretion?
Stated as simply as possible, prosecutorial discretion has probably saved
the system from a premature and total collapse. The purpose and goal
of liberal prosecutorial discretion, has been subverted and perhaps irre-
versibly altered to meet the exigencies of the moment. Where the courts,
at an earlier time and under less compelling circumstances, upheld prose-
cutorial discretion because it allowed the prosecutor the opportunity to
"see that justice is done" without going to court, the courts today up-
hold the same discretion, because without it, there can be no justice at
all-the system would collapse. If the prosecutor did not have the power
188. Supra note 28, at 788.
189. The Public: A Hard Line, Newsweek, vol. 77, Mar. 8, 1971 at 39.
190. Id. at 39.
191. Id. at 39. See also the Chicago Crime Commission, supra note 51, which
charges that Cook County judges are "overly lenient."
192. Supra note 189, at 39.
193. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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to drop cases, charge the accused with lesser included offenses, or bar-
gain pleas, the system would grind to a halt.
The time has come to re-evaluate prosecutorial discretion and amend
it to some degree. The prosecutor's power to "prejudge" cases by agree-
ing to guilty pleas in exchange for concessions on his part is not an execu-
tive function and never has been. Judging a defendant's guilt and sen-
tencing him is a judicial function. A list of the decisions now subject to
the prosecutor's discretion, which were never intended to be within his do-
main, could go on ad infinitum, as demonstrated throughout this comment.
The purpose of this comment is not to imply that the prosecutor will
necessarily misuse or abuse his expanded discretion; but, that the
present circumstances have forced the power of prosecutorial discretion
into areas and purposes for which it was never intended. If the prose-
cutor is to assume new functions within his veil of prosecutorial discre-
tion, then perhaps it would be wiser and safer to define the scope and
function within which prosecutorial discretion can properly operate.
It is now time to weigh the social benefits of our present system of crim-
inal justice against the social cost. The concern revolving around the in-
tegrity of the process focuses on the potential abuses implicit within the
general system "that to some degree at least encourages plea bargain-
ing,",1 9 4 and permits wide discretionary powers in order to insure its own
existence. Due to such pressing circumstances that face our criminal
courts today it is time to re-evaluate the discretionary power of the prose-
cutor because "nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws .... 195
John A. Lundquist
194. Supra note 170, at 463.
195. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). See Burns, Mapp v. Ohio:
An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 80 (1969).
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